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(8).
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Court, I have believed my appeal already to be before the
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NEWTON C. ESTES,
Plaintiff and Pro
i

Se Appellant,
VS.

1i

ELDON BARNES,

(

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No.

900418

Warden, Utah State <
Prison, Defendant J
and Appellee

]

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Will any Foote parole relief ever really happen if
the Courts continue to shield themselves from hearing their
own same due process secret information violations that
first put us in prison byi
1) using a procedure not found in habeas rules to
grant AG's dismissal motion?
2) exhibiting an actual desire to continue
incarcerations by refusing to review and rule upon the
sentencing violations of statutes and case law as set forth
in the twelve citations* of my Table of Authorities?
3) following Judge Rigtrup*s pattern of "I do not
second guess a trial court* whereby habeas corpus review of
due process denials at sentencing for plea bargains no longer
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takes place in Utah district courts?
Must it not be assumed that this reluctance to
hear the facts debated stems from their own participation
with the prosecutor, defense attorney, and presentence
preparer to hand down original, charge incarcerations based
on information kept secret from the defendant?
How can he correct another judge when he,
himself, regularly presides over the following violations
of due process and equal protection of the law?
a) He notices affidavit defense attorney has
gotten signed if for original charges, not the reduced ones,
b) He accepts prosecutor's testimony and evidence
in secret after telling defendant at pre trial none would be.
c) Allows presentence report preparer to tell
client he will not see the report.
d) Bases his sentence on reporter's previous crime
allegations he knows defendant has not seen.
e) Or, if seen, refuses defendant apportunity to
challenge and rebut.
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
U.R. Civ. P. 65B(i) (1) first paragraph? (7) all?
(8) all.
77-18-1 (4) and 77.35-22 (a) are from my appeal
by Jay Edmonds.

I insert them here on the following page.

3
.TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
7 7 - 3 5 22(a)=*U.R. Or

P. Rule 2 2 ( a )

Ut)on the entry of a plea or verdict
of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall, set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 30 days after the verdict
or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may
commit the defendant or may continue or
alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court
A/
shall afford the defendant an opportunity
rtr6fly
to make a statement in his own behalf and
\)\jj\
U n
to present any information in mitigation |f£" - ffrt***'
of punishment, or to show any legal cause '|fl
why sentence should not be imposed. The
prosecuting attorney shall also be given
an opportunity to present any information
material to the imposition of sentence.
77-18-l(*0, U.C.A. (1953), as enacted by Laws,
1.980 (as amended) also relates to the sentencing process:
Prior to the imposition of any sentence,
the court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of
time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or information from
other sources about the defendant- . . .At
the time of sentence, the court shall hear
any testimony or information the defendant
or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence.
^his testimony or information shall be presented in open court on record and in the
presence of the defendant.

77-35-13 is relevantly quoted at bottom of page 19
of addendumized subject habeas corpus.
As noted in the Table of Authorities, the relevant
texts of the listed court decisions are located by their
oage number in the subject habeas corpus addendum IN BOLD
TYPE.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I hereby incorporate AG's recitation from pages one
thru four of his memorandum in support of dismissal.

I then

add to it to bring it ut> to date.
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAN R. LARSEN (4865)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NEWTON C. ESTES,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

v.
M. ELDON BARNES, Warden
Utah State Prison

Case No. 900903466
James S. Sawaya

Defendant.
Defendant, by and through Dan R. Larsen, Assistant
Attorney General, hereby submits the following memorandum in
support of defendant's motion to dismiss.

fen*

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff pled guilty on June 21, 1988, to attempted

aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, and to

A
dealing in harmful material to a minor, a third degree felony, in
the Second Judicial District court, in and for Davis County,
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge, presiding.
Plea Affidavit.)

(See Exhibit MA";

Plaintiff was sentenced on July 19, 1988, by

Judge Douglas Cornaby to serve concurrent terms of five years to
life and zero to five years in the Utah State Prison.

(See

Exhibit "B"; Judgment, Sentence and Commitment.)
On the day of sentencing, plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal claiming that his due process rights were violated at the
sentencing hearing by the consideration of the pre-sentence
investigation report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole.
(See Exhibit "C"; Notice.)

On August 1, 1988, plaintiff filed

with the Utah Supreme Court a pro se petition for certificate of
probable cause and motion for stay of execution reiterating his
due process claim.

(See Exhibit "D"; Motion and Petition.)

The

petition and motion were denied on August 15, 1988, because
plaintiff had not first sought relief in the District Court.
(See Exhibit "E"; Order.)
On or about August 30, 1988, plaintiff filed a motion
seeking to correct alleged tampering with his sentencing hearing
transcript.

(See Exhibit "F"; Motion.)

The Utah Supreme Court

denied plaintiff's motion on September 19, 1988, because the
issue was under consideration by the District Court.
Exhibit "D"; Order.)

(See
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On or about September 8, 1988, plaintiff filed with the
Utah Supreme Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming
that his sentence was a result of ineffective assistance of
counsel and collusion on the part of the judge and prosecutor.
(See Exhibit "H"; Petition.)

The petition was dismissed by the

Court on September 19, 1988, for the reason that the issues
raised in the petition should be included in the pending appeal.
(See Exhibit

H

I M ; Order.)

Plaintiff sought a certificate of probable cause in the
district court claiming that he was prejudiced by the use of a
presentence report and by alleged tampering with his sentencing
transcript.

(See Exhibit "J"; Certificate.)

On September 27,

1988, the district court denied plaintiff's application for
certificate of probable cause finding that the issues raised by
plaintiff were not novel, fairly debatable, or integral to
plaintiff's conviction.
Plaintiff then filed a new petition for certificate of
probable cause in the Utah Supreme Court claiming:

(1) that

defense counsel was ineffective in the plea and sentencing

process; (2) that the presentence report was wrongfully prepared
and used by the sentencing court; (3) that the sentencing judge
abused his discretion by imposing a prison term reither than
probation; (4) that the dealing in harmful material to a minor

7
statute is unconstitutionally vague; and, (5) that the sentencing
transcript was purposefully altered.
certificate.)

(See Exhibit "K";

The court denied the petition for certificate of

probable cause on February 6, 1989.

(See Exhibit M L"; Order).

On appeal, plaintiff was represented by Jay D. Edmonds
who filed a brief of appellant attacking plaintiff's guilty plea

and sentence.

(See Exhibit "M"; Brief.) After the case was

poured over from the Utah Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
affirmed plaintiff's conviction and sentence in an unpublished
opinion.
1989).

State v. Estes, No. 880279-CA) Utah Ct. App. Nov. 16,
(See Exhibit "N M ; Opinion.)
Plaintiff then sought a pro se petition for writ of

certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court requesting review of the
Court of Appeals opinion.

(See Exhibit "0"; Petition.)

was denied by the Supreme Court on March 6, 1990.
T ;

Review

(See Exhibit

Order. )
On January 29, 1990, plaintiff filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the Utah Supreme Court resubmitting his
September 8, 1988, petition which had been denied by the Supreme
Court for the reason that all issues could be included in the
pending direct appeal. (See Exhibit MQ"; Petition.)

The new

petition was referred to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup of the Third
District Court.

After a hearing on March 26, 1990, Judge Rigtrup

entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in dismissing the
petition for the reason that all the issues raised in plaintiff's
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recycled petition could and should have been raised on direct appeal
or-were raised and decided on appeal.
of Pact and Conclusions of Law.)

(See Exhibit "rM? Findings

At present, plaintiff's appeal

from Judge Rigtrup's order is pending in the Utah Supreme Court.
(See Exhibit "S"; Appeal.)

Plaintiff thereupon on June 2, 1990, filed a
second Petition for Habeas Corpus Post Conviction Relief
(Case #900903^66)—and which is the corpus of this appeal—
for the purpose of preserving for federal 225^ review
appellant counsel's ineffectiveness for having refused to
raise plaintiff's announced intention to found his appeal
on ineffectiveness of hi© pre-trial and sentencing attorney.
Judge Sawaya on June 22, 1990, used UCJA 4-501 (l)(d) to
grant Larsen's dismissal motion without any hearing
whatsoever.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
I hereby incorporate pages 5 thru 10 from the
statement I included in my January 3, 1990, writ of
certiorari-

I then add to it to bring it up to date.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1)

On Friday, July 15, 1988, I learned from AP&P

investigator, Judy Valeika, that late that day she had given
Judge Cornaby the biggest presentence report ever compiled in

9
Davis County (R.48) which contained the reaaons for life

no
Imprisonment but which I had y£ right to examine.

I thereupon

prepared a Notice of Appeal (R.34) to present at the Tuesday,
July 19th sentencing.

It stated how I had been misled at Plea

Bargain <T1 page 10 lines 18 and 19) by the courta' statement
that no evidence or testimony would be presented to Judge
Cornaby.

See also Memorandum In Support of Probable Cause (R.71

pages 5 and 6 and Addendum #3 2/7/89).
One half hour before sentencing was scheduled, my
lawyer handed me the huge report.

From this cursory review I

saw it was full of outright lies, rumors and innuendo©.

I then

hand wrote on my typed notice, "lies heavily solicited by Judy
Valelka" and presented it to the Court during sentencing.
I never had seen or even heard about the two
prosecution documents called "Notice of Intent to Present
n\cn~hhs

_

Evidence and to Use Hearsay Testimony" (R.48) till eight monthla
later when Supreme Court Clerk, Geoff Butler, sent the
presentence report to me In prison.

tf
a)

On July 12, 1988, one week prior to

sentencing, I was summoned to Farmington courthouse by my lawyer
to help him oppose the prosecutor's presentation of "Playboy"
and other sesrch warrant evidence to the judge in hia chambers.
These documents are contained as sppendlxes In Brief of
Appellant and Brief of Respondent.

Namba dated them July 6,

10
1988.

After a half hour wait during which I aaw Namba, my

lawyer and Judy Veleika confer in the aecond floor lobby,
Vanderlinden told me to go back to work that, "All had been
taken care of*.
court documents:

Thla acenario waa aet forth in the following
on page 5 and 6 of my 9/8/88 Memorandum in

Support of Habeaa Corpua and 12/31/88 Memorandum in Support of
Probable Cauae (R.71 item q pace 16).
Aa a reault, highly Inflammatory, damaging
Information waa preaented to the judge that I never aaw till I
waa aeven months in prlaon, but which formed a major basis for
his giving me life imprisonment in lieu of probation.
b)

On July 12, 1988, becauae of the facts set

forth in item a) above, the Diatrict Court cauaed a Minute Entry
be placed in the file, <aee addendum in Appellant's Brief) that
aald I waa preaent during Namba'e presentation*

The Appeala

Court cited thia entry aa proof I aaw and approved the documents
and thereby gave up my right to confront and rebut their
contenta in open court*
%

2)

During the July 19, 1988 sentencing hearing <T2) I

challenged again and again the accuracy of the presentence
report and claimed I should have a right to rebut it.

Qn page 3

lines 18 thru 22 my lswyer said I wanted to challenge the
statement of the neighborhood collateral contacta.

On page 3

lines 10 thru 16 I was shown to want to challenge harmful
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innuendoa about taking neighborhood boya skiing.

On page 3

lines 16 and 19 I waa shown to believe alleged statements of
parenta were not true.

On page 4 llnea 13 and 14 I waa ahown to

feel all the rumors were eomlataly out of hand.

On page 11

llnea 9 thru 11 I said the collateral contact recapa contained
solicited innuendos rather than genuine opinions.

On page 11

llnea 20 thru 25 and following. I aaid the interview reporta had
been deliberately twiated to suggest wrongdoing. On page 12
llnea 5 thru 11 I atate the innuendos lead to the exact oppoaite
of the truth and need to be subjected to rebuttal.
All theae complainta were baaed on reviewing leaa
than 1/5 of the report.

When finally sent me by Supreme Court

Clerk, Geoff Butler, I spent 2 days snalyzing the whole report
and writing ten (10) pages of rebuttal I hoped to get into the
record at some stage.

X
Of all the neighborhood collateral contacts, not
one said they knew of a single instance of even a suggestion of
specific sexual misconduct.

This bottom line conclusion waa,

for reasons best known to Judy Valeika, never articulated or
even hinted at.

She overwhelmed thia baaic concluaion with

thirty (30) pages of rumors and innuendos about my power to
manipulate children, neighborhood feara, and that I had Intent
to commit other sexual Crimea.
After all theae neighborhood and my
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daughters'interviews failed to show any kind of aexual
aiaconduct, Ma. Valelka, during the week of July 10th, informed
me that the AP&P needed

aome aerioua inatance of paat aexual

miaconduct or elae I could not be recommended for treatment on
the outside, but would have to be incarcerated for willful
inexcusable sexual misconduct.

I invented a story <T2 lines 11

thru IS).
Thla ia the background of her report on me on page
14 next to last paragraph (R.46) that caused Judge Cornaby'a
rebuttal to my claim of a clean paat that I had Indeed moleated
a girl 39 years ago <T2 page 6 line 24 thru paoe 7 line 20).
3)

The unrebutted misinformation of the presentence

report plus the aecret inflammatory information preaented by the
prosecutor to the judge resulted in great harm to me at

x
sentencing aa can be judged by the following remarka of Judge
Cornaby'a contained in the aentencing transcript <T2> :

page 3

line 23 thru page 4 line 11 he saya I would be able to change
wltneaaea' true atoriea into untrue onea if he allowed me to
examine them.

He accuses me of writing my wife's letter to him

and gets called a liar by the one who was with her when she
wrote it.

(gee also T3 page 9 lines 19 thru 25).
Page 9 lines 2 thru line 9 page 10 he concludes my

hitting Justice White (who waa not injured) waa a prior act of
violence rather than one of civil disobedience.
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Page 13 lines 7 thru 11 he uses the unrebutted
preaentence report to overrule Dr. Roby's ISAT 8-page
psychological exam report <R.4S) that testing "
did not indicate that he BU££^TB from
the sane degree of psychopathology which
the vast majority of those assessed for
similar offenses do...Cand3 fails to
suggest any underlying major affective
or characterological disorders to which
Newt's sexually illicit behavior may be
attributed...Cand] Newt appears a much
IBBB pathological picture than most
offenders this examiner has evaluated...
land it would be this examiner's
recommendation that Newt not be
incarcerated at either Utah State Prlaon
or Utah State Hospital since he does not
appear to need the intensity of
treatment or supervision such facilities
provide...tand3 this examiner feels, in
this case, it might be best to require
Newt Estes to successfully complete BTI
outpatient program..."

X
Page 14 line 20 thru line 7 page 15 Cornaby
Instead says 1 am a high risk offender who tries to replace
parental relationships because Z have en Intent to have sex with
them and that I have long had deep-seated sexual problems.
page 15 lines 15 thru 18 saya I hit Justice White
because that Court would not protect me from my own weaknesses wheress I ected on the fact that it waa tyranny to deprive local
governments of their right (should they desire to do so) to
promote the general welfare as had always been done in the past
by moat non-seaport communitlea.

1*
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT

1)

It was a violation of constitutional rights to due

process to be told at guilty plea that the State would not
present any evidence or testimony because it thereupon went
ahead and presented all this evidence and other material which
would not have been admissable at trial.
To have used all this evidence to determine the
defendant's punishment while preventing him from even learning
of the contents so he could rebut them is an unspeakable assault
on due

proc^mB.

k)

Judge Sawaya, in addition to going outside the

rules of 65B(i) to grant Larsen's dismissal motion, did not
even bother to either acknowledge or rule upon nr£ 6/29/90
Notice to Submit which I had correctly extrapolated from
65B(i)(6) governing habeas response deadlines.

Whereas I

could not get him to use the rules in jny behalf, he went
outside them to help the AG.
It is obvious that my second habeas petition's
June 2nd Motion that Habeas Not Come Before Judge Rigtrup
was useless against the AG-habeas court conspiracy.
5)

On September 5, 1990 this Court rejected my

Rigtrup dismissal appeal without comment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
in

•

i

n

ii

i

•

i|

in

i

••

Habeas Corpus review of improper sentencing of
rclea-bargain defendants (and probably most others as well)
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is de facto no longer available.

These improprieties violate

the Utah and U.S. Constitutions, a whole body of state and
federal case law, as well as specific state statutes.
They occur because the district court, prosecutor,
defense attorney and the AP&P reporter have agreed to collect
and use secret, incriminating and unverified information to
justify imposing original charge sentences.
Consequently the district judge in the prison's area,
so as not to condemn actions he, himself, regularly practices,
engages with the AG in a sham procedure of using rules not
found in 65B(i) in order to protect the AG from ever having
to answer, and the judge -from ever having to hear, the due
process violations in the commitment proceedings,

Habeas

Corpus dies right there,
Their conspiracy works so well the judge need not
even read the petition, rule on any defendant motions, or
even have him notified of his court date.
THE ARGUMENT*
•The arguments/discussions with case law citations
are in the attached addendum Second Petition for Habeas
Corpus Post Conviction Relief.

I presume referring there

will not inconvenience.
1) Steve Vanderlinden presented me an affidavit
containing the original rather than reduced charges.

(See

my Rigtrup habeas memorandum #900901219, page five, items
b and c.

I refused to sign this fraud? he threw in waste
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basket, and I retrieved and saved it.
At pre-trial. Judge Cornaby did not ask what
happened to cause eight minutes and -pages 2, 3 and 4 of the
transcript to be used to reduce the charges in the courtrooom.
As set forth for you on page k> of my #900015 appeal.f
Judge RigtruT)fs dismissal prevented my showing him that bogus
affidavit I had in my hands as I stood before him,
I argue that these events could not occur unless
both judges themselves routinely accept original charge
affidavits from plea-bargain inmates.

(Out of seven roommates,

four had this happen to them. )
2)

After hearing me told at pre-trial no evidence

or testimony would come before the court, prosecutor Namba
nevertheless presented proposed testimony and search warrant
evidence.
With Vanderlinden's connivance, it was done secretly
in chambers.

It was full of lies and prejudicial conclusions.

I was in prison before I saw these two documents.
SEE PAGES 19 and 20 FOR TEXTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE
VIOLATED STATE AND CASE LAWS.

ALSO PAGE 14 SECOND PARAGRAPH.

3 ) * w a s told by AP&P reporter I could not examine her
presentence report.

My lawyer complied by neglecting to go

fetch it and call me in to review the immense 130-page document.
He tossed it to me 20 minutes before sentencing was scheduled.
A#t>t was full of lies too numerous and serious to properly rebut
without hours of preparation.

17
SOME OP THOSE LIES ARE SET FORTH ON PAGES k9 5 AND 6.
4)

At sentencing, I told Judge Cornaby it was full

of lies I wanted to challenge.
lawyer remained silent.

He ridiculed this demand. My

The judgef thereupon, says the report

causes him to override Dr. Roby's assessment that I am a very
low-risk offender.
there.

I hand him a Notice of Appeal then and

Vanderlinden remains silent.
A detailed account of those proceedings with

transcript citations were filed in this Court on pages 7 thru
10 of my 1/13/90 Writ of Certiorari and are previously inserted
herein.
THE TEXT? AND DISCUSSION OP STATUTE AND CASE LAW
JUDGE CORNABY VIOLATED IN MY SENTENCING ARE ON PAGES 16 THRU 19.
VANDERLINDEN1S DERELICTION IN ASSISTING THE COURT TO
PROCEED ON INACCURATE INFORMATION IS SHOWN ON PAGES 12 THRU 15IT QUALIFIES ME AS A VICTIM OF STRICTLAND VS. WASHINGTON'S
INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL DESERVING HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF.
5)

I am in a prison which unconstitutionally provides

no law library or appeal lawyers (as well as no copy machines,
our own, or any, typewriter).
I, therefore, have no means to examine any case law
which Larsen claims allows the court in a 65B(i) action to
disregard its rules and go to another book to come up with
the administrative rule UCJA 4-501(d) as a purported ground
for dismissing a habeas without so much as even a hearing on
that motion.
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I have twice moved the courts to require the AG
to furnish texts of his cited cases, but I now presume that
since theirs and the AGfs purposes are the same, they were
never even read.

I do know they were never acknowledged or

ruled upon.
Having thus far been unable to penetrate this
sham of justice, I have, nevertheless, been able, to "Drove
beyond a shadow of doubt that "unusual circumstances11 show
fundamental fairness must put an end to these summary
dismissals.
THE TEXT AND ARGUMENT OF THE RELEVANT HURST V. COOK
AND OTHER DECISIONS IS ON PAGES 8 THRU 12,
CONCLUSION
Appellant orays his guilty plea be ruled unknowing
of the consequences, and thus involuntary? that his sentence
be vacated for not having been imposed in accordance with
Utah statutes and case law; and that he be unconditionally
released from prison since inaccurate information caused
his being sentenced as a dangerous repeat offender, rather
than receiving probation as would be normal for a 63-year—old
low-risk first time offender
I pray Third District's denial of due process will
now be reversed.
In addition, he would move the court to appoint
counsel for any courtroom hearings; and to retrieve record
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from district court.
He wouldf alsof move that the AG be ordered to
furnish the text of any cases his response may cite.
He would also move that the CLerk be instructed
to mark all envelopes -privileged Legal Mail" to save 2 to
5 days of delivery time.

(This habeas was dismissed

because I did not answer in five days.)
Respectfully submitted this

I>Qt~~' day of April,

1991.

NEWTON C. ESTES

NEWTON C. ESTES,
Attorney Pro Se
Utah State Prison #18884
Draper, UT 84020
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE

NEWTON COLLIER ESTES,
Plaintiff Pro Se
-VS-

SECOND PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS POST CONVICTION RELIEF
Case #900901219

UTAH STATE PRISON WARDEN,
Eldon Barnes,

Case #

Defendant.

Petitioner, NEWTON COLLIER ESTES, asserting that there was a
substantial denial of my rights under the Constitutions of Utah
and the United States in the proceedings which resulted in my
incarceration, now proceeds in accordance with URCP 65B(i) and
with Hurst v. Cook.
I am now illegally restrained at the Utah State Prison
at Draper from a life sentence I received July 19, 1988 in Judge
Cornaby's Second District Court for pleading guilty to one
attempt to fondle our 12-year-old part-time maid (76-5-404.1).
My restraint is illegal because (a) my appellate counsel
refused to ask for a judgment (and thus preserve for federal
review) on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim my
probable cause application said would be the fundamental element
of my appeal (see attached affidavit);

(b) appellate counsel

was negligent in not federaly preserving the other due process
violations by his forgetting to cite the applicable U.S.
Constitution provisions.

And finally (c) because my appellate

counsel refused my request to answer those points of Respondent's
Brief which turned out to be the same ones used by the Court of
Appeals to deny my appeal.
ISSUE TO BE RAISED:

Was appellate counsel's performance

so deficient as to be violative of the Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and Article One Section Twelve of the Utah
Constitution?
In support of the preceeding three allegations of this
complaint, I ATTACH THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS:

a)

My announced intention to base my appeal on

ineffectiveness of counsel is shown on the attached Supreme Court
Probable Cause Memorandum (1) pages 4, 11, 12, 17, 18 and 19.
On those last two pages I called the Court's attention
to pages from the Transcript of my district court Probable Cause
Hearing (2) where I told Judge Cornaby that my lawyer had
knowingly participated in my being sentenced on unseen or
inaccurate information by his not reviewing with me the
presentence report.

Our colloquy starts at line 19 on page 25,

continues thru page 26, then takes up again on pages 30 thru 33
(all attached).
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In spite of his possessing all these records, Jay
Edmonds refused in his 1-23-89 attached letter (3) to raise
ineffectiveness on my appeal,
b)

Pages iii and iv (Table of Authorities) of Jay

Edmond's Appeal Brief showing he used no U.S. Constitutional
citations to preserve for federal habeas corpus review his many
offhand references to the Constitution and due process.
c)

My six-page 7-6-89 letter (1) to Jay Edmonds asking

him to respond to the wrongful claims in Respondent's Brief that
(My Item 1) I had ample time to review the report, that it
contained no misinformation, and I asked for no rebuttal
opportunity; that I failed to show (My Item 3) how I could have
rebutted the presentence report; and (My Item 4) that I was
"present" and knew and approved the contents and submittal in
chambers of two prosecutor documents of evidence, proposed
testimony, and a very harsh sentence recommendation.
Copy of the Appeal Court opinion (2) where, on page 4,
that I had plenty of review time; where, on page 6, that I asked
for no rebuttal, nor did I show what I could have rebutted; and
where, on page 5, that I knew the contents of those two
prosecutor documents and was present to ask that they be
presented in chambers.
My 7-29-89 questionnaire letter (3) written in
desperation to Jay Edmonds after his failure to respond to mine
asking him to answer Respondent's Brief and to all the other
letters I had written him.
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**Please note on page 5 of my 7-6-89 letter where I
asked that he not let Appeals Court "have any misunderstanding"
on my being present to approve submission of those two prosecutor
documents I had never seen or heard about.

Also note on page 4

my asking if his failure to offer the contents of my 10-page
rebuttal to the lies in the presentence report was because he
planned to offer them at oral argument.

PRESENTENCE REPORT LIES

I will now set forth some of those lies which Jay
Edmonds refused my request to present to the Appeals Court, and
which Judge Cornaby said caused him to conclude I was a dangerous
repeat offender, and which will cause the Parole Board to reach
the same conclusion:
1)
24

Reference is made in two places (pg. 8

4 and pg.

4) that a neighbor "knew he got one other girl - she got up

and moved away after they found out."

I would have rebutted that

one mother allowed both her daughters to regularly visit us till
she remarried and moved to Bountiful.

Why didn't the

investigator, Judy Valeika, ask who this other girl was and go
question her and her mother before having the judge believe there
was another victim?
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2)

Valeika also told the judge at page 8

"almost happened" to another girl.

4 that it

Her subsequent interview with

that girl failed to reveal so much as even a suggestion of an
improper touch.
3)

Why did she then want the judge to think it had?

Valeika1s reporting at page 9

3 and page 17

2,

that the victim's "fear of retaliation haunts us" would
have been discredited by my showing the victim repeatedly came
over to harass me in my yard or on the front porch after
arraignment.
4)
last

Valeika went to great lengths on page 17

, and page 24

2, page 20

4 to impugn improper conduct between me and

a boy I was helping learn how to use our lawnmower.

If she

really had wanted the judge to have helpful and accurate
information, she would have gone to see him and ascertained that
nothing improper had ever occurred.
If she had followed a procedure of fundamental fairness
rather than one of burying the truth with pages of scurrilous
lies and hearsay innuendos, I would be a free man today.

I would

also be free if I had been allowed to make these challenges in
either the district or appeals court.

Will Mr. Larsen now try to

see that I am not allowed to challenge the lies by habeas corpus?
5)

Valeika used

5 on page 18 and all of pages 23 and

24 to tell the judge a diatribe of a mother's worthless innuendo
to suggest an improper relationship with her son.

However, all

the judge should have wanted to hear would have been the one
sentence at page 23

2 that "Mrs. Goodliffe told this agent that

Eric swore that Newton never did anything to him, and he still
swears this."
I hereby attach those two pages 23 and 24 (attachment d)
to give the Court some idea of the kind of stuff she used to
overwhelm the judge with so he would go along with her maximum
punishment recommendation•
That such as this would find its way into a Utah
courtroom, and rebuttal be refused, is a disgrace to the Bill of
Rights.
I could recite much, much more, including an amazing
inexplicable gun enhancement.

Need I do so to prove that, but

for the ineffectiveness of counsel, either Judge Cornaby or the
Court of Apeals would have learned that I could and would have
rebutted the deceitful, flagrant innuendos and outright lies the
AP&P Dept. presented to Judge Cornaby, if I had been allowed to?
I could have replaced their deceit with the bottom-line summary
it so successfully hides, namely that despite tremendous
opportunity, I had never come close to molesting another child.

Because my previous Petition to this Court was dismissed
without a hearing on the finding that I improperly raised issues
which could have or should have been raised on direct appeal, and
which the Court lacks authority to re-examine, I now proceed in
accordance with 65B(i)(4).

I HAVE SHOWN HEREIN GOOD CAUSE

(INEFFECTIVENESS OF APPELLANT COUNSEL) IN THIS SECOND APPLICATION
WHY THERE WERE "UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES" WHICH PREVENTED MY APPEAL

FROM SPECIFYING THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM I HAD
SAID IN MY PROBABLE CAUSE PETITION IT WOULD CONTAIN.
This same ineffectiveness caused a non-response to
Respondent's Brief to deny me my right to have what appeal there
was to be truly judged on its merits.
The accompanying Supporting Memorandum will show how a
denial of this petition would amount to a ''fundamental
unfairness" and would as well deny me my Fifth Amendment rights
to due process of law.
The petitioner would assert that the issues raised in
his petition have not been previously adjudicated in any
proceeding.
Wherefore, the petitioner having no other adequate
remedy at law would request that this court order relief as
follows:
That the court issue its extraordinary writ in the
nature of habeas corpus, releasing the person of the petitioner,
Newton C. Estes, from the custody of Utah Department of
Corrections, or, remanding Petitioner's conviction to the Second
Judicial Court of Davis County, with an order that the State of
Utah within an appropriate period, decides on how it elects to
proceed thereon, or in a lesser event grant the petitioner,
Newton C. Estes, an evidentiary hearing, before this court, so
that petitioner may more fully develop related facts herein, that
the court may determine relief that would be just and equitable
under said circumstances in the case at bar.
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Respectfully submitted this

day of

1990.

Newton C. Estes In Pro Se
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
SUCCESSIVE WRITS HURST v. COOK
I, Petitioner, Newton Collier Estes, now lists the
circumstances which resulted in the fundamental unfairness that
triggers the Hurst vs. Cook 113 Utah Adv.

Rep.

3 "unusual

circumstances" test governing initial or successive use of Utah's
65B(i) habeas post conviction procedure where a sentence has once
been supposedly "fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a
prior habeas proceeding."
I am entitled to such successive use because my
collateral attack is made in the above unusual circumstances of
"where an obvious injustice of a substantial and prejudicial
denial of a Constitutional right has occurred, irrespective of
whether an appeal has been taken."

Habeas is the correct

procedure "for assuring that one is not deprived of life or
liberty

irrespective of whether the error was categorized as

jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional."

This is "so that a

prisoner will always be able to raise his claim in a state Court
and thus

there will be no occasion for federal habeas corpus,

because a state remedy is available."

This procedure has the function "to provide a means for
collaterally attacking convictions when they are so
Constitutionally flawed that they result in fundamental
unfairness."

Hurst says "the general judicial policy favoring

the finality of judgments cannot, therefore, always prevail
against an attack by a writ of habeas corpus'1 because it "does
not have a higher value than Constitutional guarantees of
liberty"

and because such protection "is of greater

importance than is res judicata."

It then goes on to quote the

U.S. Supreme Court's stating in Sanders vs. United states, 373
US1, 8 (1963) "the inapplicability of res judicata to
habeas

is inherent in the very role and function of the

writ."
Hurst also quotes Martinez, 602 P2d at 702's reason for such
suspension of the rules is so that "the law should not be so
blind and unreasoning that where an injustice has resulted, the
defendant should be without remedy."

Then it uses Cordianna, 660

P2d at 1115 to emphasize "the unusual circumstances test was
intended to assure fundamental fairness and to require
reexamination

on habeas corpus when the nature of the alleged

error was such that it would be unconscionable not to reexamine."
The Utah Supreme Court often considers habeas claims
"even though the issues raised were known or should have been
known at the time

of initial appeal."

A prime example of its

doing so is when there was "ineffectiveness of
counsel

especially in the investigation and preparation of a

case."

(My whole case-sentencing-was based on three documents -

two of which Vanderlinden never showed me or told me existed, and
the third, 130 pages long, he never gave me time to read, nor did
he, himself, examine over 1/5 of it, even though he saw it
disagreed with everything I had told him.
were totally incriminating.)

All three documents

To further back up my right to

claim habeas review of the outcome of my appeal, I cite
Commonwealth v. Hayes (1979) 411 A2d 769 conclusion "however, he
is claiming the ineffectiveness of prior appellate counsel, and a
question may not be considered finally litigated or waived in a
proceeding in which the convict has been denied effective
assistance."

Likewise Commonwealth v. Allen (1980) 421 A2d 1094

held that "ineffectiveness of counsel constitutes extraordinary
circumstances precluding a finding of waiver

"

In light of all of the above, why did Mr. Larsen, if he
believes everyone should be sentenced on accurate information as
required by law and Constitutional due process, unfairly subject
me, without law books or lawyer, to the rigors implied in Schad
v. Turner 27 Utah 2d 345?

Namely that "res judicata applies in

full force to habeas cases" when our highest court has said that
such a proposition was never the law, was largely ignored (except
by Mr. Larsen) and that herein (Hurst) "it is overruled". Why
would he cite Hurst in his motion to dismiss when almost the
whole decision is taken up in showing the part he cited does not
apply in a case such as mine?

Why?
-«0-

Why?

I have clearly shown that if I can further back up

the

assertions of ray complaint, I will qualify under Hurst as one for
whom "successive petitions should be permitted if for some
justifiable reason (I) was previously unable to assert the rights
or was unaware of the significance of relevant facts."

The

assertions in my petition also qualify me to an exception to the
65B(i)(4) rule allowing one petition only for all claims because
State v. West, 765 P2d 891 "nonetheless allows any number of post
conviction complaints if good cause is shown."
And I have shown the "good cause" that justifies a
successive claim because I have established "new facts not
previously known which would show the denial of a Constitutional
right

and the existence of fundamental unfairness in a

conviction".

I have thus met my "burden" as a second petitioner

"to show the ends of justice would be served by permitting a
redetermination of the ground".
Petitioner believes his habeas shows flagrant
Constitutional due process and effective counsel deprivations.
However, he need not claim 65B(i) grounds of "substantial denial
of his rights" under the Utah and U.S. Constitutions because
Hurst says petitioner need only show sentencing and appeal were
infected with a fundamental unfairness "which might fall short of
invoking the due process clause, but which nevertheless raises a
fair question as to whether a new trial should be granted".
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Having established my right to a successive habeas
complaint by showing the requisite "unusual circumstances"
(ineffective assistance of appellate counsel), I now ask the
Court to further use this action to examine those issues which
that ineffectiveness prevented the appeals court from
considering.
The following three issues which my counsel refused my
requests to raise on appeal or in answer to Respondent's Brief
are what have caused a substantial denial of my rights under the
U.S. and Utah Constitutions to occur in the proceedings which
resulted in my incarceration and its affirmation.

I.

INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL
DISCUSSION/ARGUMENT

All these citations are from Strictland v. Washington
(1984) 80L Ed 2d unless otherwise referenced.
Before stating "Since fundamental fairness is the
central concern of the writ of habeas corpus, no special
standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness claims in habeas
proceedings" (33), the Court said a fair trial "is one in which
evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an
impartial tribunal." (2,3).

To assure such a fair trial the

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals said in McGee v. Crist (1984)
739 F 2d505 that "the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel demands that the defense counsel exercise
the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent

defense attorney."

The Court's benchmark for deciding if the

assistance met Sixth Amendment standards was "whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a
just result." (8)
The "unusual circumstance" evidence accompanying my
Petition showing Appellate counsel's refusal to raise my basic
claim of ineffectiveness of guilty-plea assistance clearly
qualifies me to the exemption in Commonwealth v. Hayes (1979)
411 A2d 769 where, after stating "It is well-settled that the
failure to raise an incompetency argument at the first
opportunity without a claim of extraordinary circumstances
justifying the failure results in waiver...," the court remanded
because appellate counsel's failure was such that "a question may
not be considered finally litigated or waived in a proceeding in
which the convict has been denied effective assistance."
A petitioner must then show that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." (25).

(In

all my previous pleadings I had undertaken to show that the
unrebutted lies and innuendos of the presentence report caused
the Court to overrule Dr. Roby's assessment which said that I, a
first-time offender, presented less danger than almost any client
he ever examined, and for it to then brand me, instead, a
high-risk offender with long-standing, deep-seated sexual
problems with an intent to molest more children.)
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Aside from Judge Cornaby's refusal of, and
Vanderlinden1s failure to assert my demands for rebuttal, the
denial of due process at sentencing stemmed from counsel's
failure in those "particular duties to consult with the defendant
on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed
important developments in the course of the prosecution.

of
Counsel

also has the duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as
will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process."
(12).

By never consulting with me to plan opposition to the

contents of the presentence report which contradicted everything
he had learned from me, he failed me the same way as happened in
People v. Pulley (1979) 394NE 2d47 where there was "nothing in
the record to indicate that counsel conferred to ascertain his
contentions of error, or filed a withdrawal motion pursuant to
judicial rules, and therefore the defendant was denied effective
assistance."
I assert that my result, along with the inexcusable lack
of consultation, overcomes "the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound
trial strategy" (14, 15). Add his never letting me know the
existence, let alone the contents of the prosecutor's in-chambers
presentation of evidence and proposed testimony and a maximum
sentence recommendation which my attorney never told me had been
made, I believe I have fulfilled my burden to "identify the acts
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the
result of professional judgment" (16, 17). At sentencing, my

-) + -

lawyer, after reading my Notice of Appeal before I handed it to
the judge, additionally failed to make the motion to withdraw my
guilty plea necessary to any appeal.
Since he never consulted with me on any of these
matters, he failed to live up to the norm that "Counsel's actions
are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices
made by the defendant and on information supplied by defendant"
(19).
I submit the citations and circumstances set forth above
show I would probably have received a minimum sentence had it not
been for my counsel's errors and neglect, and that probability is
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Had he asked

for a continuance to expose the lies in the presentence report,
"it is reasonably probable that competent counsel could have
combined the exculpatory evidence with favorable character
evidence to produce an effective case for leniency", Johnson v.
Kemp 615F, Supp at 364 (1985).
Therefore habeas should be granted to explore "whether
there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer-including the Appellate Court, to the extent it
independently reweighs the evidence-would have concluded that the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not
warrant death" (27, 28).
I assert that in my case "the result of the particular
proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the
adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just
results" (30) .
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II.

PRESENTENCE REPORT DISCUSSION/ARGUMENT

In Utah v. Lipsky 608 P.2d 1241 (1980) the sentence was
overturned because defendant never got his hands on the
report-even though he had asked the report be prepared, heard all
its relevant contents reviewed, but heard nothing to challenge.
In my case I did not a^k for the report, was prevented by my
lawyer from ever learning most of the contents, vigorously
challenged what I did see, and was refused opportunity to rebut
by the Court to which my lawyer, Steve Vanderlinden, spoke not
one word in objection.
The Court said "fundamental fairness requires that
presentence report be disclosed to defendant prior to
sentencing."

The trial Court made days available for review to

my attorney, but he did not show it to me till too late (one-half
hour) to review-and plan rebuttal.

The Court knew he hadn't.

Together they denied me that fundamental fairness the Utah
Constitution requires, and which led Utah v. Howell 707 P.2d
(1985) to "the due process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the
Utah Constitution requires that a sentencing judge act on
reasonable reliable and relevant information in exercising
discretion in fixing a sentence."
My sentencing transcript clearly violates the Lipsky
dictum on page 244 that, after disclosure, "If the defendant
thinks the report inaccurate, he should then have the opportunity
to bring such inaccuracies to the Court's attention.

I was not

given the opportunity then.

This petition asks that I be

released or given it now.
Ineffectiveness denied my Lipsky "right of a defendant
to at least know the substance of the presentence report..." and
the Court's ridiculing my demands for rebuttal showed complete
disregard for my right and his duty..."to prevent a court from
proceeding on inaccuracies."
Why are efforts still being made to deny me Lipsky1s New
Jersey citation that "fundamental fairness required that a
defendant be given the opportunity to examine fully and
controvert any prejudicial information that played a part in the
sentencing procedures"?

Especially when that prejudicial

information caused the judge to rule that I, a first-time
offender, professionally judged as unlikely to repeat, was given
life in prison because I was a dangerous, habitual offender with
deep-seated sex problems and an intent to commit more sex crimes?
Compare what happened to me with Lipsky:

"the

information about the defendant must be accurate if society and
the individual are to be properly served."
Utah v. Casarez 656 P.2d 1005 (1982) saying "Procedural
fairness is as obligatory at the sentencing phase of a trial as
at the guilt phase", remanded so the report's contents could be
reviewed.

It added "if the defendant cannot inspect the contents

of the presentence report, his Constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel is seriously impaired if a judge
may rely on information which may be inaccurate and is unknown to
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the defendant."

Of course, my counsel had aready deprived me of

that right, himself, by concealing the contents till too late to
identify and organize a rebuttal.
He thus succeeded in supplying the judge what he needed
to mock Casarez at page 1008 where "there is no substantial
reason for sentencing criminal defendants on the basis of
confidential information gleaned from a variety of more-or-less
reliable sources without affording those defendants some
opportunity to point out mistakes in that information."

All he

needed, and got, was for Vanderlinden not to go g€>t the report so
I would have no time to read and answer it.
Mr. Larsen already knew every citation I finally
discovered for this Memorandum.

His "fundamental fairness" was

to pretend they don't exist and have the largest law firm in Utah
engage in "adversarial process" against someone whose right to a
prison lawyer or law library he would also oppose.

Conversely,

he believes in supporting what Casarez on page 1008 undertook to
prevent:

"If a defendant were not allowed to correct an error at

the time of sentencing, the error is likely to go undetected for
as long as the defendant remains subject to the criminal justice
system, since the presentence report remains in the file of the
defendant and is used by the Board of Pardons and other
authorities in making decisions as to the length and terms of his
incarceration, rehabilitation and parole."
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If the A.G. had any concern for the public good, it
would be trying to identify the plea-bargain inmates, expecting
minimum punishment, who never saw the contents of their reports,
then take steps to now allow review and correction before the
Parole Board uses the same lies to add more time.
twenty-two I asked had not seen theirs.

Twenty out of

We could each be out

earning a living and paying taxes and saving the taxpayers
$18,000 per year per inmate.

III.

MISCELLANEOUS DISCUSSION/ARGUMENT

When my lawyer went into chambers with the prosecutor to
hand the judge the latter's Notice of Intent to Present Evidence
and Use Hearsay Testimony and Sentence Recommendation (two
documents of whose existence or content I stayed unaware), my
statutory rights under 77-35-13 were violated.

The first

document contained graphic descriptions of all the evidence taken
by search warrant, while the other speculated what that evidence
showed was going on in my mind leading up to the crime.

In so

doing, these three officers of the Court effected a conspiracy to
deprive me of the Constitutional and statutory due process right
that "the circumstances must be presented by the testimony of
witnesses in open court...

No affidavit or testimony of any

kind, verbal or written, shall be offered to or received by the
Court or a judge thereof...M
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My appeal lawyer was so incompetent, he failed to cite
that Utah statute.

He also failed, as he was reading Lipsky, to

notice its proscribing what they did by saying on page 1247 that
"basic decisions affecting the disposition of a defendant and his
liberty ought not to be based on ex parte communications to the
judge making the decision."

Ex parte occurred when my fate was

decided without my knowledge or presence.
star chamber proceeding.

It is also known as a

If Mr. Larsen still plans to use the

"if he didn't then, he can't do it now" ploy, I suggest a look at
13 ALR 4th

20 summary of Commonwealth v. Allen (1980) 421 A2d

1094 which says "Ineffectiveness of counsel constitutes
extraordinary circumstances precluding a finding of waiver."

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
My Petition's evidence and Court documents show how I,
in addition to not having effective appellate counsel, was denied
due process to have made a knowing guilty plea, to examine
sentencing documents, to rebut an inaccurate presentence report,
and to have effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

This

Memorandum shows precisely how these deprivations violate the
Constitution of Utah and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Bill of
Rights Amendments.

This showing secures my right to

consideration of a second successive petition for writ of habeas
corpus.
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I, therefore, pray my incarceration be declared illegal
and my immediate release be ordered.

Notes:

(1) I ask that Mr. Larsen, should he feel duty

bound to file to dismiss, be required to mail me any included
decisions I haven't cited in my Memorandum; (2) I ask notice be
taken of accompanying Motion That Petition Not Be Filed In Judge
Rigtrup's Court, because he stated he does not review conviction
proceedings (the purpose of habeas corpus) because that would be
to "second guess" the trial judge; (3) I am now also filing a
Pauper's Oath Affidavit and (4) a Motion to be appointed pro bono
counsel.

Respectfully submitted this

day of

1990.

NEWTON C. ESTES, Pro Se

,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this

/sf* day of

Anril, 1991. I did hand carry four true and correct copies
of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT tot
Dan Larsen, Assistant Attorney General of Utah, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT

84114.
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